in a country where extortion is a common practice among officials the sound and sight of angry protests against it resonate with the many who have been its victims. Moreover people blame the government that the officials serve as well as the individual officials who oppress them, making extortion a crime that merits the special attention of governments everywhere.
That makes action to reduce extortion a political priority. There are ethical, social and economic reasons -as well as political -why the reduction of extortion merits priority, but to consider these let's clarify first how extortion differs from other forms of bribery.
Although extortion is a form of corruption involving bribes, it differs from bribes offered to officials or others who provide a service in order to get some unfair advantage. That is enticement or seduction by the client or customer. Some offer and pay bribes to entice an examiner to award them a driving licence when not competent to drive a car, others to win a contract unfairly against the competition. The person who pays the bribe and the person who accept the payment both benefit and are both happy with the transaction, whatever harm it may bring to other victims, often victims they do not see. Moreover their principal victims -those killed by an incompetent driver or the employees who lose their jobs in a company made bankrupt by lost contracts, for the two examples given -may not know why they suffered their misfortunes. The payment of money or some other benefit has been an act of collusion between those who offer and pay and those who receive, a secret they share. They will look for similar opportunities in future and may well become friends. Thus with extortion the principal victims and villains see and know each other, but with enticement they are invisible to each other. With both there are many hidden victims who suffer from the contribution of each corrupt act to a malaise that affects political stability, national security, the economy and social harmony. We shall consider later ways in which the distinction between bribes offered for unfair favours and bribes demanded to get fair treatment can become blurred, with one type of corrupt practice leading to another. For now the argument is that extortion is an especially wicked and harmful crime and because of that merits concerted action to reduce it.
Extortion starts when an official or agent demands a bribe to provide fair treatment that he or she ought to provide freely or for a fixed fee. Many reports of public anger and protest against corruption include complaints against some organisation or department of Government, or about life more generally, that 'everybody has to pay bribes to get things done'. People feel they have to pay when that is necessary to get fair treatment, when facing extortion. Nobody has to pay to get an unfair advantage. Though if told 'everybody does it' they may feel it would be unfair not to join in, and that failure to do so would be unfair to themselves and their families. The temptation to join others in acting corruptly can be strong. Extortion gets demanded by employees and agents in the private sector and civil society as well as by officials. In this paper when reference is made to officials most of the comments are applicable to employees in other sectors too. Where distinctions are thought important these will be explained.
Although the internet and Facebook revolution have amplified their impact protests against frequent or entrenched corruption have a long history, and there is reason to think many have been directly mainly against extortion with officials demanding bribes. Awareness of some past protests against extortion could put present concerns into context. For example:
3,000 years ago in Jerusalem, protests against corrupt rulers led to a change of government and change of constitution. The small nation of which Jerusalem was capital was ruled by a group of judges, and the record states that the sons of Judge Samuel 'turned aside after gain ... took bribes and perverted justice'
2 . The implication is that the judges actively sought the gain, with bribes demanded to avoid delays or get a favourable judgement, and the people demanded the change.
In 1992 in Italy the chance finding that a local government official in Milan was surprisingly wealthy led to investigations that found he had become so by taking bribes 3 . He managed a home for old people and took bribes from suppliers for awarding contracts. It is likely he took the initiative in demanding the bribes. He was convicted, and investigations cascaded through cities and sectors at all levels of Italian society. Eventually eighty members of Parliament and four prime ministers were implicated in a massive corruption scandal and widespread public anger. The result was a change of Government and a change of constitution as in Jerusalem 3,000 years before and in Tunisia a few years later.
Other indications of concern about extortion include an imperial edict by a Chinese Emperor, Hsiao Ching over 2,000 years ago that 'Some officials … make a business of presents and bribes' (quoted by Alatas 1990) 4 . Those words 'make a business' suggest again that the officials did not simply accept bribes when they were offered but demanded extortion payments.
An Islamic Fatwa, the Fatwa Alamagiri 5 ( or Fatawa-e-Alamgiri dating from the Mogul Empire circa 16 th century) includes reference to the ethical dilemma extortion poses for those faced with its demands, saying that a present to influence a judge is unlawful, but
'if a present be made to a judge from a sense of fear, it is lawful to give it but unlawful for the judge to accept it'.
Muslims have said that to accord with Islamic principles this should be applied only in an emergency.
Three stages of corruption in some Asian countries in the 1980's were described by Alatas 1986 6 . He describes a progression is from a society where the payment of bribes is optional (and usually considered wrong and undesirable) to one where it is accepted as normal and finally compulsory. Alatas ranks extortion together with protection money as self-destructive types of corruption, ranking the three stages as:
• restricted, not necessary to bribe to live;
• rampant and all-pervading, bribes optional;
• self-destructive, extortion, protection money.
Patterns of frequent entrenched corruption in parts of Africa in the 1990s are described by de Sardan 1999 7 , who lists characteristics that include:
1. corruption is complex and wide ranging, covering a number of illicit practices; 2. corruption has become the norm; 3. everybody hates corruption but nobody will denounce the corrupt; 4. corruption corrupts, and once the rot sets in little can be done to stop it; 5. corruption is considered 'fair' by its perpetrators, but not by its victims.
de Sardan suggests that where development brings rapid social and economic change those with newly-acquired riches are expected to display these and share them with an extended family, and sometimes others 8 . To fail to get as rich as possible, legally and illegally, is to let them down. Not to act corruptly is morally reprehensible.
Because he thought the elites were unlikely to make reforms, de Sardan predicted:
that the feeling of helplessness about corruption is likely to generate fundamentalist movements, be they Islamic or of other 'puritanical' tendency, 'to attempt to change the present course of affairs'.
Perhaps we have seen that 1999 prediction fulfilled in part by terrorist acts (and some extreme reactions to them). Increased efforts to combat corruption, if effective, and the impact of 'UNCAC', the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, could help make these fundamentalist reactions less extreme, though a word search of the UN Convention shows no explicit mention of extortion.
Halpin (2011) alleged that the widespread practice of extortion in Russia caused resentment and anger and left the middle classes feeling defenceless against 'a rapacious bureaucracy'. His catalogue of troubles includes:
Want a [school] place for your child? Better stuff a brown envelope for the principal. Need hospital treatment? The doctor will see you for cash. Have to drive somewhere? Keep a mix of notes in your wallet so that you can haggle to keep your licence when a traffic cop pulls you over for some imagined infringement.
That matches reports from other countries where one group has a seeming monopoly of power.
The examples of high-frequency corruption from a few countries should not lead citizens elsewhere to feel confident our countries will remain less corrupt or think our citizens less corruptible. Thus a paper by Karstedt and Farrall (2006) 9 about present-day 'middle-class' corruption in Britain and Germany, shows how many 'respectable' people act corruptly or collude in corrupt acts 10 .
All corruption causes a loss of trust. But extortion by government officials is especially likely to cause a breakdown of trust in government that can provoke public protest. The political, social and economic damage make it important that all involved should understand the problem and know what actions may help reduce it. Before considering extortion in more detail it is relevant to consider the characteristics and consequences of corruption more generally.
Corruption is a crime, and people commit crimes when they have a motive, find an opportunity to do so without expecting punishment or any ill consequences, and can justify the action to themselves. Often the motive is money. Everybody wants more money so everybody has a motive to act corruptly, but that motive is strongest in times of crisis from the costs of illness, car repairs, coping with adventurous 'love affairs', drug addiction or blackmail. Sometimes the driving motive is to be part of the crowd or team, showing that we are free from constraint (from family, system or state) -free to take risks and join in adventurous or reckless behaviour with others. Violent street gangs provide an extreme example. Sometimes the aim is to get excitement and a thrill, or to prove an ability to beat 'them' by evading detection or arrest. Kennedy (2009) 11 tells of someone stealing ten cars a night: steal one, drive off, leave it some distance away to be found by its owner or somebody else, bus back, steal another. He was addicted to the excitement, the 'high' from the risk involved, the reward of 'getting away with it', not motivated by the money. Similarly if someone escapes detection when committing a corrupt act they may get some smug satisfaction from doing it again. For others the motive is competition, as for the super-rich wanting to own a bigger yacht or more expensive piece of art than their peers, as described for 'the oligarchs' by Hollingsworth 2009 12 .
Increases and decreases in the level and frequency of corrupt acts depend on the perceived opportunity to escape detection or punishment. The contemporary recognition of this is proving of value in tackling crime in general (Sparrow 2000 13 , Kennedy 2009 14 ) and matches an ancient proverb that 'opportunity makes the thief' with attributions back to the thirteenth century, including one by Francis Bacon about 400 years later. The importance of opportunity is implied by the often-quoted words of Lord Acton, 1887 15 Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
To which Lord Acton added, in words quoted less often but fitting experience with leaders in many nations, 'Great men are almost always bad men'. Power and greatness bestow opportunities on both men and women. Despite this the assertion of human culpability and willingness to do wrong may still shock some. 17 assures its readers that 'reforms are not aimed at people, but at the systems within which they work'. To blame systems may save us from blaming other people but it takes away people's responsibility for their actions, detracting from human dignity and responsibility. The fact is that 'Honest People Cheat', to quote from a paper describing a large-scale experiment with American students reporting their scores in answering questions (Ariely 2008 ) 18 . This suggested that most: • when tempted, will be a little dishonest, regardless of the risks; • even when they had no chance of getting caught, still did not become wild liars; and • they had an incredible ability to rationalise and justify our dishonesty.
It is people who act corruptly not systems; although systems should be changed to reduce their opportunities to act corruptly (a motivated car thief only steals a car when he finds one). The reluctance to blame others is right. We share the same nature, we act corruptly or benefit from corrupt acts by our governments or agencies or business ventures that have brought benefit to our economies. Given the opportunity, if we think 'everybody else is doing it', we may think it unfair on our families or ourselves if we do not 'join in'. We are part of the problem, and all need to act to reduce the damage it causes.
To distinguish bribes offered and accepted for unfair benefits (which are acts of collusion), from bribes demanded 'for the proper performance of a task not its perversion' 19 (acts of coercion and extortion), it seems helpful to use the word enticement for bribes that are offered. One meaning given for 'entice' in the 'Shorter Oxford English Dictionary' is 'To allure, attract by the hope of pleasure or profit'. That fits offering a bribe. The consequences of extortion match well its linguistic origins in the Latin verb torquēre from which we derive torque (or twist) and torture, as pointed out by Wrage 2007 20 .
The tables that follow are intended to clarify the differences between enticement and extortion. To appreciate the consequences of acts of enticement and extortion it is helpful to consider different groups of victim from corrupt acts in general.
The principal victims from enticement are those hidden victims over whom somebody else has gained an unfair advantage: thus a company may lose a contract and make staff redundant, or lose many contracts and go bankrupt; a student may fail unfairly to get a university place; or patients may die because they cannot afford the bribes needed for lifesaving drugs. Corruption kills.
The principal victims from extortion are especially those on whom the threatening demands are made. If they pay the bribe they lose the money or other favour that has been demanded, if they don't pay they lose something that should by rights have been theirs. But there may be many hidden victims too: the officials or employees who extort may favour one company rather than another, chosen a candidate who is not qualified or not the best for the job, or given the drugs to a less needy patient.
The secondary victims from corrupt acts include others involved directly with the employee's organisation -clients, customers, workers, management and shareholderswhen increased costs or unfair provision of goods or services put at risk the organisation's reputation. Lost trust in a government may be reflected in the ballot box or by protests in the streets. Lost confidence in a private company and its staff may deter investors and customers. Lost protection for health and safety at work leads to injury and death, or bribes to get a driving licence get someone hit by a car. Again, corruption kills. Within corrupted companies honest staff lose their commitment and work less well.
Many 'indirect victims' suffer the consequences of corrupt activity. There may be failures in national security, crime prevention, and health, safety and environmental protection. Taxes may not be collected or get diverted, Governments may lose money paying contractors inflated prices. Reduced resources will then bring failures to protect security and safety (and 'corruption kills'). The global reach of money laundering and an inability to protect the physical and information environments make international cooperation essential and may require international intervention. 'Corruption anywhere threatens everybody everywhere' 21 . So, in summary, how do the consequences from extortion differ from those for enticement? Why bother about extortion? In summary, for two reasons. First, because of the damage it causes, leading to anger against governments and the risks of public unrest and protest and personal harm -risks that are intensified by new technologies giving added power to the poor who suffer most as its victims. But, secondly, because there is hope. Those who extort bribes are known to those who suffer directly from their demands and therefore more vulnerable to discovery than the perpetrators of other forms of corruption, especially enticement where two people act in collusion to their mutual advantage.
EXTORTION
Extortion has been described already as an especially vicious and hurtful crime, with unfair demands that are acts of bullying and coercion. Examples have been given already. These may not only be demands for financial gain. An applicant may be asked to give sexual favours to get employment -and getting that job may be a matter of life and death for sick members of her or his family. Society as a whole is the victim. But the person who has to pay, the parent, the applicant, the company's agent, is the principal victim. The poor suffer most; right to justice, fair treatment and safety. After the transaction the principal victims who paid the money or gave the favour, feel exploited, soiled, and angry against those who made the demands. Some are reduced to tears; some get driven to suicide; as was Bouazizi.
By contrast, anyone who offers a bribe to get unfair benefits may develop a clandestine feel-good relationship with the official who accepts them. Such an act of collusion and cooperation appears a friendly crime, with its many victims unknown and unseen. The principal actors both gain from and are bonded by a secret shared between them. Both hope to find ways to make similar gains in future, sharing news of likely opportunities.
Different patterns of extortion develop in different places and times as people learn from each other about opportunities to benefit corruptly without expected penalty, as explained by Srinivasan 2005 22 . A few find those opportunities for themselves. Because of this the patterns of extortion have fashions or waves. Discussions between representatives of government departments, businesses and Non-Governmental Organisations can help to detect those fashions as they develop and action taken quickly to close the opportunities (as found in the 'London Fraud Forum' for which occasional meetings were called by the Metropolitan Police 23 ).
There are other patterns of extortion. 'That's extortionate', a friend said when told the price of a telephone call in a country with a monopoly telephone service provider. It was not illegal: the price was advertised. But prices set by monopoly providers or cartels can be legal but unfair. Concern about the retail prices of the pharmaceutical products of a multi-national company in a country where only one imported brand was available led the government to limit the prices for its products. Those limits were the equivalent costs for that brand in other countries nearby, where bigger markets made companies compete 24 .
The distinctions between enticement and extortion are important but as indicated in Table  2 the persistence of one provides opportunities for the other. In particular, if officials or political leaders succumb to the offers of bribes by companies seeking contracts, other companies that learn of this will think they 'have to pay' bribes to do business and be placed under 'extortionate' pressure to do so.
To target action to reduce extortion we need to understand it well. Research studies into corrupt behaviour are difficult but not impossible -it is hardly surprising that those best at the art of corruption are shy to discuss their craft. Faced with situations where he wanted to explain events that were not then susceptible to experiment, Einstein 25 followed an example set by other physicists by using 'thought experiments', imagining the different consequences that would follow from different conjectures. (Einstein recalled how, at the age of 16, he imagined chasing after a beam of light.)
As a 'thought experiment' imagine officials responsible for issuing licences to clients who come to get the licences in person:
• Some officials are offered bribes by clients applying for licences who want them issued quickly ahead of others who applied earlier. The officials refuse the offers.
• One official gets very short of cash, pressed to repay a small debt. He thinks the managers treat him unfairly, and thinks 'they', the managers, get rich corruptly. He tells himself that would make it 'fair' to accept a small bribe 'just to speed things up'. When a bribe is next offered he takes it, though scared someone may notice money changing hands. Nobody notices.
• Short of cash once more, he does the same again. And again. The fear of discovery remains but progressively diminishes with each successful corrupt transaction. It can even add spice to the occasions by giving him a sense of achievement and pride at his ability to fool the bosses and get rich without risk. Or so it seems.
• Those extra riches lead him to live more extravagantly. For weeks nobody offers a bribe but he needs more money. One client is in a hurry. So he quotes a waiting time longer than necessary but hints that he might be able to shorten the wait... His acceptance of bribes has escalated to a request for cash to provide good and timely service. That later becomes a demand and his practice of extortion to avoid long but unnecessary delays becomes more frequent.
• A friend in the office tells him she is short of money and he tells her how easy it is to 'make a little extra'. She does so, and tells her friends, until it seems 'everybody' in that office is demanding extortion payments for licences to be issued in a reasonable time that could and should be provided more promptly for only the proper fee. The clients complain to each other but don't know to whom to report their problem. In some cases the victims may not realise what is happening, the officials telling them there is 'an express fee' that 'they must pay to get faster service', so that clients think it an officially sanctioned charge (though not one for which they get an official receipt).
Most people get 'parachuted' into jobs and may be persuaded by the pressure of their new peers to join in improper practices. That experience is on record for recruits to the Hong Kong Police, not just conjecture. A Commission of Inquiry into corruption in Hong Kong was set up in 1973 in response to alleged high levels of corruption in the (then) colony, and especially in the police. The Commission's Chairman reports the welcome given to police recruits, after their initial training, at police stations to which they were first posted. Quoting from that report (Blair-Kerr, 1973) 26 with a few added explanations:
On a number of occasions during this inquiry I have been told that there is a saying in Hong Kong:
1. On their first posting to a police station newly-trained police recruits are asked by their colleagues, 'Do you want to ride on the bus?' They explain that they take bribes from the shopkeepers they are there to protect and share their gains with each other and with the station's superintendent and call this 'riding on the bus'. They invite the new recruits to 'join us in this pattern of behaviour if you wish to accept your share of the bribes', adding 2. 'If you don't wish to do that you can run alongside the bus -if you do not wish to accept corruption, it matters not, but you won't go so far or so fast.' 3. But then there is a warning. 'Never stand in front of the bus -if you try to report corruption, the 'bus' will knock you down and you will be injured or even killed or your family business will be ruined. We will get you, somehow.'
Taken together, the imagined office and the Hong Kong report suggest a progression. First there is a perceived opportunity leading to the acceptance of a bribe. Then more such opportunities are found, and exploited. Then ways are found to create them with requests and later demands for extortion money. With the Hong Kong police this had gone further, to protection money -either the police warning shopkeepers 'we will not protect you unless you pay', or worse 'if you don't pay, we ourselves will beat you up and seize your goods'. The money is demanded not only for the proper performance of a task but to avoid serious harm. Syndicated corruption involving a senior officer helps create a situation where new recruits learn that they are expected to join in. Many, like those police recruits, do not have to discover corrupt opportunities for themselves. Those officials who extorted money from Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid and the police who beat him may have been similarly trapped in systemic or syndicated corruption. Many who start with 'gentle acts of crime get brutalised, themselves becoming victims of the process, as can happen with prison warders or the military.
The Commission of Inquiry in Hong Kong led to the establishment of an Independent Commission Against Corruption (the ICAC). After the ICAC started its work all the police were given an amnesty and many rejoiced to be set free from the habits that had trapped them. When the ICAC was established some doubted it could ever succeed. Graft -corruption -they said was part of the way of life in Hong Kong. Five years later it was claimed without serious challenge that the ICAC together with important changes in the law and campaigns for public reporting of suspect behaviour had virtually destroyed such syndicated corruption in the colony 27 .
In another Asian country some years later the local TV news broadcast live images of a police officer at a motorway checkpoint taking bribes from drivers. The TV team went to interview him and a few minutes later on live TV he explained: 'We have all been told to do it, and we give a proportion to the superintendent.'
28
Clients who offer bribes and officials who take them commit crimes and act unethically. But those from whom extortion payments are demanded are presented with an ethical dilemma. Should they pay? Would we pay? What advice should we give to any facing such demands?
There are successful examples which counter the so-called 'when in Rome' hypothesis which maintains that if corruption is widespread and deep-rooted then companies must 'play the game' in order to do business/be competitive/enter markets etc. Some companies claim to have prospered while maintaining their anti-corruption values and practices in countries where it has been thought none could do business without paying a bribe or yielding to extortion demands. For individuals asked to pay a bribe to receive treatment in the immediate situation that could be more difficult.
Mahoney (1995) 29 sees an ethical distinction between paying bribes to secure an unfair benefit and making extortion payments to secure fair treatment. He argues that paying extortion money may be ethically justified if it is
(1) necessary to do lawful business (2) necessary to receive fair treatment, and (3) linked with efforts to fight the practice.
Mahoney argues that if the alternative is not to do business in corrupted systems that could be a less helpful and less ethical option.
Many anti-corruption campaigners disagree with such a compromise and are appalled that the UN Convention Against Corruption, the UNCAC, allows facilitation payments when demanded to import goods or pass a road block (as does the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the United States but not the UK Bribery Act 2010 30 ). More generally, the claim that it is sometimes right to give in to extortion needs to be considered, untidy as it might seem. If I took my sick daughter to a pharmacy where drugs should be provided free of charge, would I pay if money was demanded for drugs to save my daughter's life? I would pay 31 .
In its guidance for the UK Bribery Act 2010 32 Britain's Ministry of Justice suggests that a defence of duress might apply if individuals have to pay to protect against loss of life, limb or liberty. But what about payments to protect a business from harm? Where the law allows, broadening Mahoney's conditions for fair treatment anywhere to include that, when the law allows, the ethical advice becomes:
Pay if necessary to protect from harm, do lawful business or do good but ask, 'What can I do to reduce the risks of extortion?' How can we combat it?
Having stressed the distinction between enticement and extortion it is now necessary to redress the balance: one usually type of bribery leads to the other. Because perceived opportunity tempts people to act corruptly, patterns of extortion demands or offers of bribes as enticement increase in frequency as opportunities are found. When extortion becomes frequent -the norm -and people say 'you have to pay bribes' to get anything done those who pay begin to reason that they can offer a little more to get some extra unfair benefit. So the bribe to get a visa without undue delay becomes the bribe to get a visa when it ought to be refused, putting the nation and its people at risk from terrorism and other crimes. The expectation of extortion demands makes enticement all too easy. Conversely when many companies pay bribes to win contracts the officials or other employees awarding the contracts begin to expect them. Then there may be no need for the spoken extortive demand, the official's extra payment may become an expectation.
Thus to enticement and extortion we might add an expectation of bribes as one feature of entrenched frequent corrupt practice. If there is very general acceptance in the local culture of these practices they become more transparent and less secretive, and it follows that transparency, while much to be desired, becomes a less effective antidote to corruption. Also public support for anti-corruption measures may become dulled. It is the actions against corruption and especially against extortion that we now consider.
ACTION
To reduce extortion and the damage it causes the goals should be clarified, different groups of actors indentified, and 'everybody' informed. Without knowing a local situation advice is impertinent and the aim here is to give examples of what has been attempted elsewhere and suggest future efforts that some may like to consider and adapt. They should not be considered as tools or toolkits, names by which some describe their antidotes for corruption, but rather as ideas of which some may, like seeds, flourish in different soils and climates.
The main suggestion is that the principal goal or target is to see behaviour change. The aim is not so much to catch as many wrongdoers as possible and get them convicted and put in prison, but to see them stop acting corruptly and act with integrity instead. Some describe this as prevention, but to prevent diseases usually means to immunise or protect potential sufferers in other ways so that they never catch them. Where it is said of corruption that 'everybody does it' most people have the disease already. The aim is to cure it or make it less frequent and severe, to reduce the damage done.
Reducing the damage caused by extortion -the suffering of individuals, increased costs, lost trust in companies and governments, and the anger generated -requires action from several stakeholders. It is not the sole province of an anti-corruption bureau or the police. The media, Civil Society Organisations and all citizens (whether 'organised' or not) have important roles to play. The victims of extortion have key roles: they have suffered from the demands made upon them and know the culprits leaving them both motivated and informed. Tentative suggestions about ways that they and other key groups may be helped are given below. But those who make the demands change tactics to minimise their risks and everybody needs to update our understanding to be more effective in helping to reduce extortion.
This is written as a paper for professional people and 'academics', partly in the hope that they -you -will consider the actions described and suggested below for consideration by the principal actors. Suggested modifications, improvements, criticisms and cautions, and proposals for totally different approaches will be welcomed.
a Encouraging the victims
The victims know who committed the crime, though they may not know the identity of a 'Mr Big' or Ms Big behind a syndicate practising such crimes. Anyone faced with an extortion demand faces a moral dilemma. Should they pay? It may be against the law for them to do so, if the payment could be regarded simply as a bribe, but to refuse could bring substantial loss. What advice might be given to those at risk from extortionate demands? Or to those who are victims already and expect to suffer again? Here are some suggestions:
delay -before saying you will pay or not; then consider one or more of these approaches try to reason -try to get the offender to reflect, while trying not to make them angry, saying for example 'this is bad for our country'; arouse feelings -'you know you won't feel good about demanding the money', or 'would you want your children (or Father, Mother) to know you did this?'
show sympathy -'I know your pay isn't fair but that's not the way to ask for help' use humour -as with the Indian zero rupee note, pictured in the next section; but whatever else you, do aim to share -if you know others served by an official who has made extortion demands on you ask them if they have had similar experiences, then seek ways together to protect yourselves and others from such demands in future;
report -even if you pay as demanded, report the crime on your own or together with similarly afflicted colleagues to managers, police, whoever -anonymously if that seems necessary for your safety;
but also stay safe -it is better to stay alive to continue the watchful actions than to die or be rendered ineffective by reporting if the risk is too high.
Victims need help in reporting corruption. Such reports are more likely to be made if: a) clear and confidential reporting mechanisms are in place; b) individuals are aware of them; and c) they know how and where to operate them; d) they believe they can trust those they tell; e) they do not fear serious harm in consequence of the telling.
For the last condition to be effective the law must not require everybody to give evidence in court if they fear harmful consequences may follow.
b Discouraging the criminals
The reasons officials and others practice extortion have been considered already. Many hesitate to commit a crime, but once they have done so and escaped any penalty they find it easier to do so again. If at first squeamish about the pain caused to others, some get hardened to that and progress to larger and more hurtful demands. These lead to demands for protection money where the threat is not just the denial of a service but physical violence or theft.
However the tendency to go from bad to worse is sometimes overtaken by a sense of unease or shame. Thus an in-depth study of health sector employees in one hospital in Tanzania by Stringhini et al 2009 33 reported 'a negative relationship between informal payments and job satisfaction and ... motivation' with participants saying that 'they felt enslaved by patients as a result of being bribed and this resulted in loss of self-esteem'. The research also found that fear of detection demotivated these employees and the financial gains did not lead to improved job retention. Another study 34 in the same sector in Albania used in-depth interviews and focus groups with members from the general public and providers. It was found that 'Members of the general public ... believe informal payments create uncertainties and anxiety during the care-seeking process, while providers perceive that informal payments harm their professional reputation, induce unnecessary medical interventions, and create discontinuity of care'.
More generally, some who practise extortion say they feel ashamed, unclean, but trapped by the expectations of their family or others. Many may welcome an opportunity to escape a pattern of corrupt behaviour that has trapped them, much as the Hong Kong police welcomed an amnesty. Sometimes it is helpful to recognise that officials who make extortionate demands are victims too, especially in countries where public service pay has not been increased to match inflation 35, 36, 37 and families expect standards to be maintained.
The vulnerability of those demanding extortion payments and the desire of some -perhaps many -for escape suggests that the military analogy for action should be a rescue mission rather than an attack. Declaring wars on those who act corruptly encourages them to seek alliances with others who feel threatened and to harden their bullying approaches rather than seek ways to escape the trap of extortionate behaviour.
c Strengthening Civil Society
Many international Non-Governmental Organisations and local Civil Society Organisations work to reduce corruption, including extortion. Although Transparency International, TI, gives examples of extortion on its website they are ranked together with other forms of corruption. TI's Plain Language Guide (2011) 38 defines bribery as:
'the offering, promising, giving, accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for an action which is illegal, unethical or a breach of trust'.
Two examples are offered: the percentages of respondents paying bribes for connection to a public water system, and for interacting with law enforcement agencies. When many people pay bribes to 'get connected' the process is extortion, with officials soliciting (or rather, demanding) an advantage as a necessary requirement for an action that is legal, to provide a service that should be provided without it. TI's definition can include extortion, but it seems to focus more on enticement. TI's annual Global Corruption Barometer for 2010 39 includes a question asking users of basic services whether they had to pay a bribe when interacting with them in the past twelve months. One in four reported that they had. That shows they had to pay to get fair treatment (there were no questions asking if they had offered or paid bribes for an unfair favour or knew others who had). Those who escape justice for their corrupt acts often do so again, and service-users may have paid extortion money several times.
Focusing again on the risks and benefits from the use of internet technology, one scheme to crack down on extortion deserves special mention. A website 'ipaidabribe' launched in August 2010 by the Janaagraha, a Civil Society Organisation in Bangalore, India 40 , invited citizens to report bribes demanded from them, and whether they paid or resisted making a payment and with what result. Statistics reported to the press show the number of allegations made against different departments and sectors, but do not name individuals. However the intention is that managers and those who should investigate corrupt acts will do so, especially where and when it is a frequently-reported problem, and individuals in those sectors and organisations will know that they should expect an increased risk of investigation and prosecution or other disciplinary action if they continue to act corruptly. By December 2011 over 800.000 corruption reports had been received.
Similar initiatives are being taken elsewhere and could be used widely. But most Civil Society initiatives are focused on building awareness and encouraging citizens to stop acting corruptly and report suspected corruption. Perhaps the most important messages are to bring hope by reporting successes elsewhere if people think corruption a fact of life and believe 'nothing can be done about it', and to warn of the risks where there is thought to be little corruption and populations can become complacent. For both situations cooperation with the media is of great value. Surveys and statistics help also, as can academic papers, but should not become substitutes for action.
Humour may help, as encouraged by 5 th Pillar, another Indian NonGovernmental Oorganisation, which distributed a Zero Rupee note to be given when a bribe is demanded 41 .
d The authorities -leaders, legislators, investigators and others

The Leaders
The Authorities -political leaders, parliamentarians or 'the legislators', judges and senior officials should all set good examples. That means acting with integrity and avoiding acts that could lead to 'reasonable suspicion' of corrupt dealings. This will make it harder for officials to justify their acts and make excuses to themselves if they demand bribes. However the popular dogma that without the political will nothing can be done to beat corruption is nonsense and a counsel for despair. It needs to be refuted strongly. Its falsehood is shown by experience (at least in the short term) by successes against corruption in the Philippines, Thailand and elsewhere (and as described in the reports from Tunisia). Leaders are sensitive to public opinion if they hope for re-election or want to protect their self-esteem or pride, and their safety. The political will can be stimulated and needs to be sustained by peoplepressure. But though the political will is of very great value, it is not indispensible.
Leadership is important in business too, for the influence of the leaders' perceived integrity on staff and clients, and for leaders to motivate the staff -lead them -to act with integrity and combat corruption within the organisation and among contractors, clients and others.
The Legislators
Those responsible, those elected to Parliament and to local government and the lawyers who advise them, should pass clear and credible laws. There is an argument that some should require judgements about facts rather than more nuanced or personal assessment 42 . For example there could be a law or regulation prohibiting public servants from receiving and keeping gifts above a certain value, as well as a law against any gifts offered or received that are intended to corrupt. Proving that intention may be much more difficult (and costly to the state) than proving the value of a gift received. There is an analogy between dangerous driving and a speed limit. Driving within that limit may still be deadly, driving faster is sometimes safe. But driving over that limit can be a matter of fact making it easy to enforce as an encouragement to safer driving. There is an advantage in using a speed-limit-equivalent for gifts. Some jurisdictions impose a zero limit on gifts that may be received, but to say an official may not accept a cup of coffee or a modest lunch or company calendar makes it likely the law or regulation will not be observed. It is better to not to have a law than to have laws that many will ignore -laws which many will not observe risk putting a whole legal system in jeopardy. There are many administrative ways to check on behaviour and hospitality: in some organisations line managers have to be informed of all hospitality received.
Laws are there to protect citizens. Many who get into the habit of practising extortion become aggressive and bullying, brutalised as described earlier. After receiving the payment they have demanded to provide a rightful service an official may give the client some additional favour. The client is then warned that if they try to report the extortion to the police there will be evidence found showing the payment was a bribe paid to the win a favour (which the officials would say was 'forced on them' and not something they had demanded). The law should allow those who report alleged extortion to be free from prosecution for their part in the activity. Law reform, if needed, is likely to be a slow process placing demands on legal advisers and legislators but requiring the cooperation of managers, financial specialists and the people to balance protection of society with protection of individual rights.
Judges are important national leaders (and most are trained lawyers). They implement the nation's laws, and hear prosecutions based on what investigators find. The corrupt have an advantage over them: their wrongly-acquired gains enable them to bribe court officials (and sometime judges) to get papers lost or cases postponed, or to lodge endless appeals over legal trivialities. The integrity of judges is important and so is their competence to get rapid yet indisputable judgements. In many countries speeding the court process is essential if convictions are to bring effective deterrence of any crime, including extortion. Judges should have only distant and cautious relationships with a local community and yet understand its values or working practices. To build the confidence of the local population in their impartiality it helps if their families and friends are in another part of the country, or at national level to build their links with judges from other jurisdictions through conferences and -even better -exchanges. 'Outsiders' in matters of justice can have valuable roles, much as external auditors for accounting and international observers for some elections.
The Investigators
Resources for investigation and prosecution are limited everywhere and if attempts are made to investigate every suspected criminal act, including all types of corruption, the diluted resources may become ineffective. One lesson from experience is that it is good to concentrate resources on one criminal activity or sector at a time. Thus suspected extortion by pharmacists, highway police or local police, teachers, etc, may be targeted at different times. Problems in such different sectors are likely to require different, tailored solutions determined by different conditions and opportunity structures. A targeted approach can then be more forceful and more cost-effective.
While it is tempting to spring surprises, hoping that a sudden burst of investigation will bring many prosecutions and convictions, it has been found better to warn those who may commit the crimes before investigations start and help them to understand that there will be increased risks of getting caught. The aim is their reform, getting them to mend their ways. In somewhat similar situations some have done this before investigations started. The public can be asked to co-operate, and the media and one by one different sectors may be protected from the worst ravages of extortion and other forms of corruption. If suspects are charged it is important to get publicity for this and to seek a speedy trial, and conviction. But the measure of success is not the number of convictions but the number 'converted' from corrupt to honest behaviour. An example of pointing to that type of success was the use of integrity tests with the New York Police Department in the early 1990s (Osborne 2007) 43 . Similarly, to check the integrity of judges and court officials it may be necessary to use 'integrity tests' or 'quality assurance', as suggested earlier 44 .
Investigation is often the responsibility of an Anti-Corruption Agency or similar body, sometimes of the police. Aiming to synchronise publicity about an intended focus for investigation and winning the cooperation of managers suggests advantages from combining corruption investigation, prevention and education within one organisation.
d Alerting the Managers
Managers are responsible for honest service, given fairly to different clients. To be fair it must also be efficient and give clients 'Value For Money'. To achieve that, managers need to ensure that none of their staff are extorting bribes from clients for the service they provide. This would make the service less fair and probably less efficient since the easiest way to extort funds is to delay service provision. Reports of delayed service are reason to suspect corrupt behaviour or incompetence and should attract special attention from managers.
Extortion, as we have seen, may involve many people in any one office acting in similarly corrupt ways. To stop this managers need some discretion in the application of laws and regulations. Where there is suspicion of corrupt acts the matter may be dealt with administratively by management in cooperation with the police or anti-corruption body, rather than in court. It may require a formal waiver of legal requirements to report suspected crimes. If that is given employees suspected by managers of corrupt behaviour could be warned they risk getting sent to prison, but told that if they make a solemn pledge not to act corruptly in future and accept management's right to use integrity tests and other measures to check their behaviour no further investigations will be made. (In some jurisdictions it is legal to tell them that the evidence will remain on file and be called on if they are found to act corruptly again.) Hong Kong's ICAC staff claim that such warnings have been found very cost effective in several parts of the public service. Several officials warned in this way have become especially hard-working and loyal out of gratitude to management. Some have cooperated in efforts to reduce corruption by others (and well able to recognise the signs of this).
In 1997 the Metropolitan Police in London adopted a variant of integrity tests as used in New York to which they gave the name Quality Assurance. This sought feedback to police responses from actors who played the part of criminals or crime victims going far beyond corruption, for example whether police seizures of a supposed stash of drugs were all handed in or whether some were fed back to the market at a profit for the police, or whether police attitudes to either criminals or crime victims were racially prejudiced. Such quality assurance with the cooperation of real clients or specially recruited agents would be legitimate ways by which managers could get informed about wide-ranging aspects of service quality, including allegations of extortion. Even if not valid in court, as in some jurisdictions, when managers know what is happening they can take measures to reduce the problems, sometimes by transfer of suspects to different posts where there is less opportunity for such behaviour or where criminal acts would put them at greater risk of discovery.
More generally, improved patterns of transparency and accountability can make extortion and other forms of corrupt behaviour less likely, the more so if care is taken not to demand excessive compliance procedures that make staff less efficient and antagonise them so that they use their energies to avoid the requirements. Motivating managers is important.
'Operation Ceasefire' reduced gun murders among gangs in Boston, USA, and Sparrow (2000) 45 suggested adapting its strategy to fraudulent billing by hospitals in the Medicare sector in the United States. Imagine this (as a thought experiment or 'conjecture') adapted for use by police, responsible agencies and managers working together to combat extortion. The resources available would be concentrated on one target area of allegedly frequent extortion demands, for example the issue of passports (or licences or pension payments) without unnecessary delay. A message would be given to all involved to explain the alleged problem and ask for their cooperation to ensure its remedy. This is best given personally by managers to small groups of their officials with opportunity for questions and feedback, but also to all stakeholders and on the web. The message could be like this, though with arrangements beforehand to ensure actions will match the words:
Many allege that some officials in this agency demand extra payments for their own personal benefit before passports are issued. The concentrated resources of management, investigators, accountants, etc, will be used to increase the risks of discovery for any who continue to extort such payments. Special attention will be given to delays and the reasons for them. Unnecessary delays often indicate extortion. If not they show incompetence which will also not remain unnoticed.
Those who have paid in response to extortion demands in the past will be asked to report this and will not be prosecuted for paying bribes. Some will be invited to cooperate in seeking to stop such demands in future. At this stage the aim is not to catch past offenders but to ensure that the agency gets a clean bill of health now, and stays clean in future. If any demands for extortion payments are found to have been made from now onwards the records of past transactions involving those members of staff will be examined in more detail.
After six weeks [obviously the period will have been considered carefully] our investigatory and other resources will move to alleged practices of extortion in other agencies, but random checks will continue to made from time among staff here with serious consequences for any staff making demands.
We shall welcome the cooperation of any staff who wish to join in these efforts to get fair treatment of our clients and safeguard our reputation, and welcome suggestions for ways to make this campaign effective.
To match this, efforts should be made to recruit some victims of extortion who expect to be victims again (as did the fruit-sellers in Sidi Bouzid and the shopkeepers in Hong Kong).
Following the pattern of integrity tests described earlier some might be equipped with hidden cameras, recorders and marked notes, and asked to apply for passports at times and places where the application is likely to be dealt with by members of staff suspected of making such demands.
CONCLUSION
Measures have been suggested to reduce the incidence of extortion and the damage done. Recommendations for action have been made that would require initiatives to be taken at different times by different groups, usually needing the cooperation of others to help focus attention on one type of corrupt practice. But the focus may move from one agency to another and strategies for continuing coordination would probably prove too cumbersome, and unnecessary. However different actors in government, civil society and elsewhere all benefit from shared information, transparency about their activities, and expectations of voluntary cooperation when two or more groups see this offering mutual benefits.
It should be stressed again that the 'recommendations' are intended for consideration in different contexts. This is not a 'toolkit' as offered for many for anti-corruption programmes but ideas that may take root, like seeds if planted in the appropriate soil and climate. The aim is better protection for all from the evils of extortion.
Any suggestions and criticism to help clarify or correct this analysis and to improve on the recommendations for action will be welcome.
